Government Employees Insurance Company v. William Charles Dennis v. James C. Holder, Et Al. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Government Employees Insurance Company v.
William Charles Dennis v. James C. Holder, Et Al. :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Joseph C. Fratto; Attorney for RespondentStephen G. Morgan;
Attorney for Defendants-in-Intervention-RespondentsDavid H. Epperson; Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Government Employees Insurance v. Dennis, No. 17267 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2461
-I 
I 
I 
I 
...__ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSUP.ANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and 
.!\ppe l lan t, 
vs. 
WI:.LIAM CHARLES 
DENNIS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES c. HOLDER, et al., 
Defendants-in-
Intervention and 
Respondents. 
No. 17267 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Fro~ a Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and For Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Jay E. Banks, Presiding 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondcnc 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
Morgan, Scalley & Davis 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn 
175 South Nest T~mple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Attorney for Defendants-in-Intervention-
Respondents 
' ~ . ., 1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTJl.H 
---------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPA~Y, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM CHARLES 
DENNIS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES c. HOLDER, et al.' 
Defendants-in-
Intervention and 
Respondents. 
No. 17267 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
From a Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and For Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Jay E. Banks, Presiding 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
Morgan, Scalley & Davis 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn 
173 South West Temple, -650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Attorney for Defendants-in-Intervention-
Respondents Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CASES CITED . i 
N?.TURE OF THE CASE . 1 
DISPOSITION rn LO\·iJ:R COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . 2 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT 
BASED UPON THE JURY'S 
FINDINGS AJ.l\ID IN ENTERING A 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTA..l\IDING THE 
VERDICT ...... . 
A. The Determination of Whether 
a "Relative" is a Resident of 
an Insured's Household is a Factual 
5 
Questior: . 6 
B. There Existed Substantial 
Disputes as to the Inferences to 
be Drawn from the Evidence lvhich 
Required Submission to the Jury 
of Whether \~illiam Charles Dennis 
Was a Resident of His Father's House-
hold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
C. The Determination of the 
Jury Was Supported by Substantial 
Evidence and the Court Therefore 
Erred in Overruling the Verdict 21 
CONCLUSION .. 24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Aetna Casualty and Suretv Company 
of Hartford, Connecticut vs. 
Means, 382 F.2d 26 (10th 
Cir. 1967) .... 
American States Insurance Company 
v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 
(&tah 1971) . . . ... 
Bartholet v. Berkness, 189 N.W.2d 410 
(Minn. 1971) .. 
Great American Insurance Company 
vs. Marshall, 266 F.Supp. 
208 (D.S.C. 1967) ...• 
Hardesty v. State Farm Mutuai 
Automobile Insurance Comoanv, 
382 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1967) 
Hardware Mutual Casualty Company v. 
Home Indemnity Company, 60 
Cal. Rptr., 508 (Cal. App. 
1966) ........... . 
Koer v. Mayfair Market, 19 Utah 2d. 
339, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) 
Lecus v. American Mutual Insurance 
Company of Boston, 260 N.W.2d 
241 (Wis. 1977) . . . . . . . 
Mel Hardman Productions vs. 
Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1979) •..... 
National Farmers Union Prooerty 
and Casualtv Companv v. 
Maca, 132 :;.;·i.2d 517 (Wis. 
1965) . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Corrmany 
v. Granillo, 673 P.2d 80 
(Ariz. App. 1977) ..... . 
Pamparin v. Milwaukee Mutual 
Insurance Company, 197 N.W.2d 
783 (Wis. 1972) .... , .. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. Holloway, 
423 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1970) 
16 
11 
11, 12 
8, 10 
12 
10 
21 
10' 20 
22 
8 
11 
10 
10 
--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSUP.ANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM CHARLES 
DENNIS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JA.'1ES c. HOLDER, et al., 
Defendants-in-
Intervention and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 17267 
This is a declaratory action filed by plaintiff 
insurance company seeking a determination as to whether 
William Charles Dennis is an additional insured under 
the terms of a policy issued to his father. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWE2 COURT 
A jury trial was held in this matter on May 27 
and May 28, 1980, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding. 
The jury found that defendant William Charles Dennis was 
not a resident of his father's household. The lower court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendi: 
finding that plaintiff had no obligation to indemnify or 
defend William Charles Dennis in any action or judg!i'ent 
arising from an automobile accident on February 25, 1978. 
On June 16, 1980, a hearing was held at which time 
Defendants-in-Intervention moved for a judgment n.o.•.'. or, 
in the alternative, for a new trial. On July 14, 1980, t~~ 
granted the motion for a judgment n.o.v., set aside the 
findings of the jury from the previous judgment, and held 
that plaintiff did owe an obligation to defend William Char~ 
Dennis and to provide insurance coverage for any judgment 
obtained as a result of the accident on February 25, 1978. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Government Employees I:-isurance Corr.;:ian:· 
seeks a reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the ··e:-:::.:: 
and a reinstatement of the judgment based :.i;:ion the jury's 
finding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by plaintiff Government 
Employees Insurance Company to determine whether William 
Charles Dennis was insured under a policy issued to his 
father, Donald R. Dennis. Because this appeal is concerr.ed 
solely with the issue as to whether there was a factual 
question for the jury and as to whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the jury's finding, it is 
unnecessary and repetitious at this time to restate the e•n-
dence which will be argued infra to support appellant's 
-2-
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contentions. Rather, it is more germane for this Court 
to understand the procedural events which occurred in 
this litigation and the effect such events now have upon 
this appeal. 
On November 21, 1979, Plaintiff filed a complaint 
for declaratory relief against defendant William Charles 
Dennis. (R. 2-4). The complaint alleged that Plaintiff 
had issued an insurance policy to Donald R. Dennis which 
provided coverage for bodily injury liability to Donald 
R. Dennis and to other additional insureds who qualified 
under the terms of the policy. The complaint further alleged 
that on February 25, 1978, William Charles Dennis, son of the 
insured, was involved in an accident with an automobile 
driven by James Holder and that a lawsuit had been subse-
quently filed in Sal~ Lake Count~ against William Charles 
Sen~is. Plaintiff sought a declaration that the plaintiff 
did not owe any obligation of defense or payment to defendant 
Willia~ Charles Dennis with respect to any claim arising 
from the February 25 accident. 
On November 28, 1979, an answer was filed on behalf 
of defendant William Charles Dennis by his attorney Joseph 
Fratto. (R. 19-20). On December 10, 1979, James C. 
Holder, his wife and children, moved to intervene in the 
action through their attorney, StephenMorqan. (R. 52). 
At that time they tendered an answer on behalf of Defendants-
in-Intervention claiming that defendant William Charles 
Dennis was covered under the terms of the plaintiff's policy. 
lR. 21-25). On December 28, 1979, the Holders' motion 
-3-
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to intervene was granted by the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson. (R. 60-62). 
On February 25, 1980, Defendants-in-Intervention 
filed a motion for summary judgment. ( R. 63) . On 
February 28, 1980, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 129). On March 4, 1980, both motions 
were heard by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft and both 
motions for sununary judgment were denied. (R. 14 7) . 
On March 21, 1980, Defendants-in-Intervention 
filed their demand for a jury trial. ( R. 1 70) . On 
May 27, 1980, a jury trial was commenced with the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks presiding. The trial continued through 
May 28, 1980. (R. 196-197). Plaintiff called four wit-
nesses and rested. Defendant and Defendants-in-Interventio~ 
called no witnesses and rested. Defendant and Defendants-
in-Intervention moved for a directed verdict at the 
termination of the testimony. The court took the motions 
under advisement. (R. 197}. 
on May 28, 1980, the jury was read the court's 
instructions and was given a special verdict form which 
required it to answer the question of whether defendant 
William Charles Dennis was a "resi:lent of '.i:'..s fat'.:er' s 
household" on February 25, 1?78. 
returned the form with the answer "~Jo." ( ::<. 19 8) . !Jn 
May 30, 1980, a judgment on the verdict was signed b:· 
Judge Jay E. Banks ordering that Plaintiff had no obliga-
tion under its policy with Donald R. Dennis to pay, 
-4-
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indemnify, or defend his son William Charles Dennis from 
any action or judgment arising from the February 25, 
1978 accident. (R. 309-310). 
On June 6, 1980, Defendant and Defendants-in-
Intervention moved for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. (R. 311-
320). The motions were argued extensively on June 16, 
1980, and the Court, at that time, took the motions 
under advisement. (Tr. 523-572). On July 14, 1980, 
the lower court granted the motions for a judgrrent not-
withstanding the verdict. (R. 378). 
After Plaintiff objected to the form of the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict originally signed by ~~e court 
(R. 379-380) , an amended judgment was executed by the lower 
court (R. 383-384). This form was also objected to and a 
third order was signed by the lower court entitled "Second 
Amended Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict." (R. 385-
386) . It is from this order and judgment that the present 
appeal is taken. (R. 387). 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SETTING ~5IDE THE 
JCDGMENT BASED CPON THE JURY'S FINDINGS A.'l'D 
r; E:JTERI~JG ~- JUDGME~T )JOTWITHST.~NDING 
':'HE "ERDICT. 
It ~s the contention of Plaintiff-Appellant that 
the question of whether a person is an additional insured 
under a policy insuring "relatives" who are "residents 
of the insured's household" is, in almost all cases, a 
question of fact. In the instant case, a review of the 
-5-
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record shows that there was a clear dispute as to the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts produced by both 
sides of this dispute as to whether defendant William 
Charles Dennis was in fact "a resident of his father's 
household." Since there was substantial evidence to 
support the jury's finding that ~e was not such a resident 
it was prejudicial error for the lower court to disregard 
the jury's findings and to enter a judgment contrary to 
the jury's determination. Plaintiff's contentions will 
now be examined in detail. 
A. The Determination of Whether a "Relative" 
is a Resident of an Insured's Household 
is a Factual Question. 
Plaintiff-Appellant issued a general automobile 
liability policy to Donald R. Dennis for a term commencing 
November 20, 1977, and continuing through e<ovember 2 0, 1978. 
The policy specifically insured a 1972 Caprice and a 
1972 Chevrolet camper. (Exhibit 2P). Donald R. Dennis 
in his application fbr the insurance listed himself and his 
wife, Francis H. Dennis, as the sole operators of these 
two vehicles. (Exhibit 2P) . 
It is undisputed that defendant William Charles 
Dennis is neither a listed insured under the policy nor a 
listed operator of the vehicles insured under the policy. 
Thus, the only way in which coverage can be afforded to 
Defendant is if he qualifies as an additional insured under 
the general terms of the policy. 
On February 25, 1978, defendant William Charles 
Dennis was driving an automobile belonging to a Sandra 
-6-
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Freestone. This suit, therefore, evolved around an 
accident in which William Charles Dennis was driving a 
vehicle not owned or listed by his father. The pertinent 
portion of the policy is limited as follows: 
Persons Insured: The following are insureds 
under Part I: 
* * * 
b. With respect to a nonowned automobile, 
(1) the named insured, 
(2) any relative, but only with respect 
to a private passenger automobile or 
trailer 
The term "relative" is defined by the policy as follows: 
"Relative" means a relative of the named 
insured who is a resident of the same 
household. 
Thus, the sole issue in this lawsuit was whether 
the definition of "relative" applied to defendant. In other 
words, was defendant William Charles Dennis a resident of 
his father's household? 
The two words in controversy during this lawsuit 
were "resident" and "household." Plaintiff contended that 
Defendant, while admittedly a relative of the insured, was 
not residing in Donald Dennis' household as was required 
o~· t:-ie ;:iolic:.: and therefore was not insured. Defendant and 
Defendants-in-Intervention, on the other hand, contended 
that William Charles Dennis was indeed a resident of his 
father's household and was therefore covered. 
It is elementary that terms contained in insurance 
contracts are to be taken and understood in their plain, 
-7-
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ordinary, and common sense usage. The test used to deter-
mine the meaning of such terms is simply what a reasonable 
person would expect such terms to normally mean. 
It has been stated that the purpose of including 
coverage for unnamed insureds is to provide protection 
for those whom, because of a close relationship, a person 
obtaining a liability insurance policy would ordinarily 
want to protect. National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Company v. Maca, 132 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 1965). 
Expressions such as "residents of household" are used 
to describe a "common type of close relationship varying 
greatly in detail, where people live together as a family 
in a closely knit group, usually because of close 
relationship by blood, marriage or adoption and deal 
with each other intimately, informally, and not at arms 
length." Id. at 601. 
In determining whether a person is an additional 
insured under the terms of a policy, it is useful to examine 
a dictionary-type definition of the terms in question. For 
example, the term "resident" is defined by Webster's 
International Dictionary as "one who resides in a place" 
or "one who dwells in a place for more or less duration. 
Resident usually implies more or less permanence of aboce, 
but is often distinguished from inhabitant as not implyinc 
great fixity or permanency of abode." Residency also 
implies "dwelling, or having an abode, for a continued 
length of time." Great American Insurance Company v. 
Marshall, 266 F.Supp. 208 (D.S.C. 1967). 
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Likewise, the term "household" has been stated 
as follows: 
There is not much disagreement in the 
definition of "household," whether they 
emanate from judges or lexicopgraphers. 
The word is synonymous with "family" 
b..it broader, in that it includes 
servants or attendants, "all who are under 
one domestic head; persons who dwell 
together as a family." Engebretson v. 
Austdold, 271 N.W. 809, 810 (Minn. 1930). 
While these general definitions of "residence" and 
"household" are helpful, they do not provide the type of 
criteria necessary to determine if a person becomes an 
insured under the particular facts of that case. For this 
reason, c.o.urts have developed a number of factors to examine 
the circumstances surrounding the claim, in order to determine 
if the policy is applicable. 
An extensive annotation dealing with the exact question 
of what determines a "resident" or member of a "household" 
states the general rule as follows: 
A review of the cases construing or applying 
the particular policy terms that are the 
subject of the oresent annotation reveals 
a wide variety ~f factual considerations 
upon which the courts have focused in 
their determination of whether a particular 
person was a "resident" or "member" of the 
same "household" or "family" as the named 
insured at a particular time. 
Those factual considerations not only relate 
to the respective individual's physical 
presence, or absence from, the named 
insured's home during the period that 
included the date of a particular occurrence, 
but also relate to such matters as the 
relationship (if any) of the individual 
to the named insured, the circumstances 
of such person's presence in or absence from 
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the named insured's home, the individual's 
living arrangements during earlier 
time periods and the individual's intention 
at various times with regard to his place of 
residence. 93 ALR 3d 420, 424. 
More specifically, the courts have examined the 
subjective or declared intent of the individual, Hardware 
Mutual Casualty Company v. Horne Indemnity Company, 60 Cal. 
Rptr., 508 (Cal. App. 1966); the formality or informality 
of the relationship between the individual and the members 
of the household, Parnparin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance 
Company, 197 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. 1972); the existence of 
another place of lodging by the alleged resident, State Far: 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Holloway, 423 F.2d 
1281 (10th Cir. 1970); and the relative permanence or 
transient nature of the individual's residence in the 
household, Great American Insurance Company v. Marshall, 
266 F.Supp. 208 (D.S.C. 1967). 
Of all of these factors, the intention of the 
parties is one of the most important evidentiary questions 
to be considered. As noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
"While it is true that 'actions sometimes speak louder 
than words,' intention is a subjective state of mind ~o 
be determined upon all of the facts includi!1g the dec:l:ira-
tion of the person inquired about.' 
Insurance Company of Boston, 260 ~.W.2d 241 (Wis. l?--1. 
Likewise, the intended duration of a stay is also 
an important factor to be examined since if a person 
comes under the family roof for a definite short period 
or for an indefinite period under such circumstances 
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that an early termination is highly probable, then it 
is unlikely the person has become a member of the 
household as intended by the insurance coverage. ~ation­
wide Mutual Insurance Company v. Granillo, 573 P.2d 80 
(Ariz. App. 1977). 
In summary, therefore, whether a person is a 
resident of the insured's household depends upon the 
particular facts in each case. Bartholet v. Berkness, 
189 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1971). These facts involve a variety 
of considerations in which the factf inder can utilize 
in determining if the criteria necessary to qualify for 
insurance coverage has been established. 
This Court, in American States Insurance Company 
v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1971), reviewed a number 
of such factors in deciding whether a college student could 
be considered a resident of her father's household. The 
lower court looked into the girl's intent and her statement 
that she considered herself to be a resident of her father's 
household while she was in school in Idaho. The court 
looked at the opening of a joint banking account with her 
father and a telephone listing in her own name. The court 
examined her income and the fact that her father gave her 
additional money to assist her in living expenses and in 
returning home. The court examined the type of furniture 
and possessions she had with her in her apartment as opposed 
~o her father's house. The court examined her voting resi-
dency in Idaho, her driver's license in Idaho, and her 
-11-
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income tax statements. 
This Court stated that the question of whether or 
not a child ceases to be a member of the family household 
after going away to school "must be determined from all of 
the facts and circumstances as revealed by the evidence." 
Id. at 1044. This Court further stated, "It is our duty 
to affirm him (the lower court) if there is any substantia; 
evidence to sustain that ruling." Id. at 1044. 
Thus, the rule is clear that except in ex"traordi:ia:: 
cases in which a person clearly does not qualify as an 
insured by any definition of the term, Bart ho let v. Berknes: I 
189 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1971), it is for the trier of fact 
to determine, based upon the circumstances and evidence 
adduced at trial, whether the person can be said to be a 
resident of the insured's household. 
As stated by the leading authority Couch, "whether 
a relative driving an insured vehicle is a resident of 
the insured's household is a questionof fact." Couch, 
Couch or.. Insurance 2d, §45:276, p. 176 (Supp.) In additior ~ I 
there are a legion of cases holding that the ultimate 
determination of whether a person is a resident of an 
insured's household is solely a question of fact for the 
trier of fact. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Hardesty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 382 F. 2d 564 (10th Cir. 1967), has 
amply demonstrated this principle. In that case the 
question was whether a son was a resident of his father's 
household at the time of an accident. In a previous 
-12-
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appeal, 361 F.2d 176, the Tenth Circuit reversed a 
declaration by the trial court that, as a matter of 
law, the son was not covered under the policy. 
Upon the remand the trial court did not submit the 
case to a jury but held, again, as a matter of law that 
under the evidence reasonable men could only conclude that 
the son was not a resident of the father's household. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in the second opinion reversed the 
lower court again and noted that the words "resident of the 
same household" do not constitute a term of art which would 
dictate a particularized legal inference to be drawn from 
family relationships. The court stated, "The function of 
the court remains, then, to submit to the jury considera-
tion of evidentiary facts from which different permissible 
inferences may be drawn." Id. at 565. 
The Tenth Circuit Court then stated the following: 
We reiterate that there is strong and cogent 
evidence in the record which would lead 
the factf inder to the conclusion that Ennis 
Jr. was residing in the household of his 
aunt who had reared and educated him since 
he was eight years old with a minimum of 
assistance of any kind from his father. Weighty 
as this evidence may be, and thus proper for 
the trial court's consideration in the dis-
cretionary function of ruling upon motions 
for new trial, we cannot say such evidence 
dictates a "one way" verdict as a matter of 
law. Id. at 565. 
Thre is no doubt that there are nunerous cases 
throughout the country in which it has been held that an 
emancipated child who has left the family residence 
but who has returned for one reason or another can be 
deemed as a resident of the family household. See cases 
-13-
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listed 93 ALR 3rd, 420, 449-451. Likewise, there are 
numerous other cases in which such a child has been held 
not to be a resident of the family household. Id. at 
451-453. However, it is patently clear that the questior 00 
to coverage is one of fact and not law. Each case, regardl10o: 
of the outcome, turns upon the circumstances existing at 
the time the liability was claimed. It is the factfinder 
who must decide whether coverage exists. As long as there 
are conflicting versions of the evidence or conflicting 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the matter must 
be submitted to the factfinder. The instant case clearly ·· 
valved a dispute which required submission and determina-
tion by the jury. 
B. There Existed Substantial Disoutes 
as to the Inferences to be Drawn from ~he 
Evidence Which Required Submission to the 
Jury of Whether William Charles Dennis 
Was a Resident of His Father's Household. 
It is interesting to note that in this case De 
in-Intervention first moved for summary judgment based 
the argument that the evidence was uncontroverted 
that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's 
household. (R. 63-73). Similarly, Plaintiff also movec 
for summary judgment based upon the assumption that 
the evidence was clear and undisputed t~a~ ~i:lis~ Char:es 
Dennis was not a resident of his father's housenold. 
(R. 133-145). 
After extensive argument before the Honorable 
Bryant Croft, both motions were denied. (R. 147). Judge 
-14- I 
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Croft held that there was clearly a question of 
fact based upon the conflicting inferences to be drawn 
from the basically undisputed facts in the record. 
After the denial of the two motions, it was 
the Defendants-in-Intervention who made a demand for a 
jury trial. (R. 170). After submission of the case to 
the jury Defendants-in-Intervention moved for a directed 
verdict in their favor. The court took the motion 
under advisement but submitted the issue of residency 
to the jury on a special verdict form. (R. 198). 
Thus, it was not until some 45 days after the 
verdict had been rendered that the lower court decided that 
there was no proper question for the jury to determine and 
that the issue should have been ruled upon as a matter of 
law. Up until this time, both Judge Croft, in reviewing 
the motion for summary judgment and Judge Banks, in sub-
mitting the issue to the jury, had concluded there was 
sufficient evidence to merit jury consideration. 
Appellant submits that this initial determination 
by the two judges was correct based upon the substantial 
difference in the contentions of the parties relating to 
the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them. A 
review of the record shows substantial questions of fact 
which should have been submitted to the jury for its 
determination. 
The instant case is analagous to the case of Aetna 
Casualty and Suretv Company of Hartford, Connecticut v. 
I 
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Means, 382 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1967). In that case a 
declaratory action was brought to determine whether a son 
was a member of the insured father's household. The case 
was tried to a jury and the identical question, as in the 
instant case, was submitted to it. The jury determined 
that the son was a member of the household. The insurance 
company moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or ' 
for a new trial. Both motions were denied. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower 
court judgment and denial of the motion, stated the 
following pertinent observation: 
There is no substantial conflict in the 
testimony as to the pertinent evidentiary 
facts. There is a big difference between 
the contentions of the oarties as to the 
inference of ultimate facts to be drawn 
from the established evidentiarv facts. 
Id. at 27. (Emphasis added). 
The court in Aetna reviewed the evidence favoring 
the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant to 
illustrate the substantial differences existing in the 
contentions of the parties. A similar listing in the 
instant case reveals the substantial dispute between 
Defendants and Plaintiff. 
The evidence favoring the position of the Plaintiff 
was to the effect that: 
(1) For more than six years preceding the 
accident William Charles Dennis had been 
financially independent and self-supporting, 
and that because he did not get along with 
his father he made only very few visits 
of short duration to his family in Utah. 
(Tr. 443-445, 458). 
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(2) At the time of the accident, William 
Dennis was merely staying with his family on 
a temporary basis for so long as it would take 
to overcome his drug dependency problem. 
Because of the friction which he had with his 
father, he indicated that he intended to be 
present in his father's house no longer 
than necessary. (Tr. 457-458). 
(3) The father, Donald R. Dennis, considered 
his son to only be residing at the residence 
until he could get enough money to go back to 
Florida and had an understanding with his 
son that he would only stay there long enough 
to get himself straightened out. (Tr. 498). 
(4) William Charles Dennis lived in Florida 
for nearly two years prior to his return to 
visit in Utah -- one year of which was with 
his girlfriend Carol Ketchum. During his 
residency in Florida he worked in several 
jobs, including operation of heavy equipment. 
(Tr. 446-447). 
(5) When he arrived in Florida he had a Utah 
driver's license. He surrendered this license 
and received a Florida chauffer's license 
in its ?iace in 197'. ITr. H7-448). 
6) When William Charles Den~is arrived in 
Florida he had a 1963 Chevrolet El Camara 
which was registered in Utah. Upon arriving 
he changed ~he registra~ion to Florida plates. 
(Tr. 448). 
(7) While he was in Florida he filed a 
Florida state income tax return for the year 
1977. (Tr. 449). 
(8) Before leaving Florida he moved into an 
apartment with a female friend and took all of 
his household goods, furniture and personal 
effects. Hei::aid one-half of the rent that was 
due for the month prior to his leaving. 
(9) At the time he left Florida his two tele-
visions, his living room furniture, kitchen 
goods, and eight-track stereo, several hundred 
books, wall pictur~s, clocks, and most of his 
clothing remained in the apartment. (Tr. 
452-454). 
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(10) When he came to Utah he only 
brought with him a small amount of clothing, 
himself, his car, and his dog. (Tr. 454). 
(11) Dennis stated that he left his things 
in Florida because his trip to Utah was more 
or less a spur of the moment type thing and 
he always intended on going back. He 
stated it was not like he was leaving his 
friends and everything in Florida, but just 
needed to get away for a while to straighten 
himself out. (Tr. 455-456). 
(12) When asked whether he intended on going 
back to his apartment upon leaving Florida 
he stated he did then and still did at the day 
of trial. He stated that on the day of the 
accident he fully intended on going back to 
Florida also. (Tr. 454). 
(13) Dennis stated that he had made no arranqe-
ments to bring back any of his possessions from 
Florida and had made no effort to change his 
license plates from Florida plates to Utah. 
(Tr. 464) . 
(14) At the time of the accident Dennis was 
driving under the authority of a Florida 
chauffer's license. (Tr. 447-448). 
(15) Dennis stated that while he could not 
recall the address of the house in which his 
furnishings were left, he would have had no 
trouble in finding the house itself and that the 
female roommate there had an ongoing residence 
in which he was always welcome. He stated that 
as far as he was concerned he had a household 
in Florida and that he could have returned to it 
at any time and still could at the time of 
trial. (Tr. 476-478). 
(16) Even though ~r. Donald R. Dennis received 
an application to renew t~e insurance approxi-
mately two weeks prior to the accident, he ~ade 
no change on the application to add his son 
William Charles Dennis as an additional driver 
of the family automobile. Exhibit 4, ~r. p. 
490) • 
(17) Neither William Charles Dennis nor his 
parents could recall him ever driving the cars 
belonging to his parents but stated he always 
drove his own automobile. (Tr. 462, 501, 
511). 
-18-
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On the other hand, the evidence favoring the position 
of the Defendant and the Defendants-in-Intervention was to 
the effect that: 
(1) William Charles Dennis had lived in his 
father's home from the latter part of November 
1977 up to and including the day of the acci-
dent, February 25, 1978, a oeriod of about 
three months. (Tr. 465). -
(2) At the time he had left Florida he had 
only been residing in the apartment with the 
female roommate for one month and could 
not even recall the address of the apartment 
or the roommate's name. (Tr. 450-451). 
(3) During the first two months of his visit 
his mother took care of him and gave him a lot 
of personal attention so be could recover from 
his drug addiction. (Tr. 508). 
(4) During the third month he obtained a job 
at the Bangerter Trucking Company and was making 
about $600 amonth driving a truck. (Tr. 461). 
(5) At the time he applied for the job with 
the trucking company he used his father's address 
on the application. (Tr. 466). 
(6) During the three month period that he 
resided with his father he was not paying 
rent on any other residence, although he was 
not paying rent at his father's place either. 
(Tr. 4 67) . 
(7) William Charles Dennis ate most of his 
meals at his =ather's residence and slept there. 
He had his ow:-i room at the house. (Tr. 467-468). 
rs) His ?are:-its bought their son small items 
s'..lc~. as ~oilet articles and gave him some spending 
::ione~· ·..ihile '."le resided with them. (Tr. 502). 
(9) At the time of the accident William Charles 
Dennis gave his address on the police report 
as that of his father's. (Tr. 468). While his 
father was under the distinct impression his 
son would not be staying with him long the 
subject was never specifically discussed. (Tr. 
501) . 
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Certainly, even a cursory review of the arguments 
propounded by both sides throughout the trial and in their 
legal memoranda (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment, R. 133-146; Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Judgment n.o.v. R. 346-360; Defendants-in-
Intervention's Memorandum for Summary Judgment; R. 
65-126; Defendant and Defendants-in-Intervention's 
Memorandum for Judgment n.o.v. or New Trial, R. 311-320) 
shows that there were substantial disputes as to the 
inferences to be drawn from the existing set of facts 
and circumstances. It is the weighing of all of these 
contentions by a trier of fact which determines whether a 
person can be said to have been a resident of the insured's 
household. 
When there are material facts in dispute or cornpeti,,: 
reasonable inferences, a trial is required in order that t:1s 
trier of fact may evaluate the position of both parties. 
Lecus v. American Mutual Insurance Company of Boston, 260 ~ 
241 (Wis. 1977). "It is for the jury, not the court, to 
determine the effect of such inferences and circumstances." 
Aetna v. Means, ~, p. 29. 
Thus, the lower court correctly submitted the 
determination of residency to the jury and correctly entered 
judgment in accordance with such verdict. As noted earlier, 
however, the error occurred in the court's subsequent act100 
of overturning the verdict and entering judgment as a matter 
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of law. 
C. The Determination of the Jury Was 
Supported by Substantial Evidence and 
the Court Therefore Erred in Overruling 
the Verdict. 
It is fundamental that a trial court can enter a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict only where there is an 
absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
In determining whether a judgment n.o.v. should be granted, 
all of the testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing 
therefrom which tend to prove the jury verdict must be 
accepted as true, and all conflicts and all evidence which 
tends to disprove it must be disregarded. Koer v. Mayfair 
'1arket, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967). 
In a more recent case, this Court stated: 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict presents solely a question of 
law to be determined by the court. In 
passing on a motion of this kind, the 
court is not justified in trespassing in 
the province of the jury in its prerogative 
to judge all questions of fact in the case. 
The court is not free to weigh the evidence, 
and the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are within the 
jury's sole province. 
In considering the verdict, the trial court 
must view the evidence most favorable to the 
party against whom the motion is made. 
This court must apply the same standards 
in its review of th2 case. ~inters v. W. 
S. Hatch Company, Inc., 546 P.3d 603, 605 
(Ctah 1976). 
Thus, Respondents in the instant case have a heavy 
burden to carry on this appeal. The question is not whether 
William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's 
household but is whether there was a sufficient dispute 
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to warrant submission to the jury in the first instance 
to support the jury's determination. Appellant submits 
that Respondents will be unable to carry this burden. 
As has been previously noted, there was clearly a 
substantial dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from t:i~ 
evidence and both parties argued vigorously that each factor 
supported or opposed a finding of residency. The same 
factors which allowed the submission to the jury also 
supports the jury verdict in that there was obviously sub-
stantial evidence presented by the plaintiff to show that 
William Charles Dennis could be found not to be a resident 
of his father's household. The numerous facts previously 
recited together with the criteria developed by courts of 
law throughout the country unquestionably support the jury's 
conclusions. 
The instant case is s~milar to the recent case of 
c'lel Hardman Productions v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979). · 
:~hereas this case involved a dispute as to an insurance 
contract, the Hardman case involved a dispute as to a motion 
picture contract. Whereas the instant case concerned the 
words "residence" and "household," the Hardman case concerr.ed 
the word "photoplay." 
In Hardman, just as in the instant case, mot~ons 
summary judgment were filed by the parties and were denied 
by a district court judge because of the large issues of fact 
to be resolved. Again, in both cases, the jury was asked a 
simple yes or no question in terms of the issue being raised. 
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In both cases the trial judge overturned the finding of the 
jury and entered a judgment n.o.v. 
This Court in Hardman found that such action was 
clear error since the meaning of the term "photoplay" as 
used in the contract was a question of fact for the jury. 
This Court noted that the lower court is obliged to not 
only look at the evidence but also to all reasonable inferences 
that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the parties moved against. The judgment of the lower court 
was accordingly reversed and the jury verdict reinstated. 
The granting of the judgment n.o.v. by the lower 
court in the instant case was also clearly erroneous. 
The jury was entitled to utilize the court's instructions 
as well as common sense to determine whether William 
Charles Dennis could be deemed to be a resident of his 
father's household within the common meaning of such words. 
Because of the substantial variance of circumstances 
and inferences argued by both parties in this lawsuit, 
it was impossible for any court to state, as a matter of law, 
that William Charles Dennis was or was not a resident of his 
father's household. Since a court could not make such a 
determination on motions for summary judgment, or on motions 
for directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence, t~e 
court similarly could not make the determination of a post 
trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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For these reasons, the lower court committed 
prejudicial error in granting the judgment n.o.v. when 
the issue was clearly ripe for jury determination and 
where there was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
conclusion. 
CONCLCSION I 
The issue in this case goes beyond the deterrninati·Jr: 
of Defendant's insurability under the terms of his father's 
policy. The true issue raised by this appeal concerns the 
fundamental right to trial by jury and the power a court 
may exercise in diluting that right. 
The initial determination of whether a ":>erso:-i qual1'.:'I 
as an additional insured via the "resident of household" 
inclusion is, almost without exception, always a question 
for . the trier of fact. In this case, a brief review of the 
numerous memoranda and the testimony given at trial 
shows the substantial dispute which occurred as to the 
various factors and circumstances argued to support or oppose 
such residency. 
The question was clearly ripe for jury determinatior.. I 
The lower court could not, as a matter of law, have enter2d 
judgment for either party on motions for summar:,' J'.ldqT"ent 
or motions for directed verdicts. The subsequent entry 
of a post judgment motion was equally erroneous i: ·:ie·,; .Jf 
substantial evidence which would have supported the jury 
regardless of which side it supported. 
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The lower court during the motion for judgment 
n.o.v. admitted that the evidence showed William Charles 
Dennis was a resident of Florida when he left and that Dennis 
always intended on returning back there as soon as possible. 
The court, however, discounted these factors and substituted 
other factors which the court thought more compelling. Such 
weighing of factors was for the jury -- not the court. 
It was for the jury to consider all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding William Dennis' travels, desires, and living 
habits. It was for the jury to decide if these events met 
the instructed criteria for "residency of a household." 
decision. 
The jury did decide. This Court must reinstate that 
Respectfully submitted, 
~?!~ 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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